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Abstract
This article explores the idea that, at the time of publication, despite several centuries of development, there was no settled conception of international law, whether there was “international
law” and if there was, what were its essential characteristics. The author starts with the assertion
that international law resembles a municipal legal system, insofar as its subjects are bound, by
external sanctions, to its right-creating and power-conferring principles. A State will, in a wellordered international community, be shaped and guided in its acts and judgments by an internal
sense of right and justice; just as the punishment of a child will hopefully give way, in time, to his
own mature self-moderation. The author then argues that the orderly scheme of international security and justice unfortunately breaks down under scrutiny, as certain essential characteristics of its
municipal analogue are found to be lacking and identifies three particularly prominent problems:
first, the effectiveness of war and reprisals as legal sanctions depends on the ability of the wronged
State, or of committed allies, to wage sanctions; second, war and limited aggression have become
too dangerous, in the light of technological advances, to continue as viable sanctions; third, the
State, against which military force is directed, consists at bottom of individuals innocent, if not
incognizant, of international offense. The author ultimately concludes that the state of international law rests somewhere between a primitive and an advanced form, both on the structural and
moral levels.

THE EMERGING MORAL FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Problems of Enforcement

At present, despite several centuries of development, there
is no settled conception of international law, whether it is in fact
"law" and what are its essential characteristics.

Though the two

are often confused, international law must be distinguished from its
sources--e.g., treaties, custom, judicial precedent, general principles of law and equity --which may or may not be binding in themselves.
Consent between particular parties, habitual behavior or municipal
rules that bind individuals can in no sense bind all States in their
interrelations, without something else.

The rule of recognition by

which these various sources might be raised to the level of law, however,
remains undetermined.
Furthermore, there exists no international legislature, no
compulsory judiciary (States must consent to be sued), and no central
organ to administer sanctions.

Consequently, legal theorists,
2

frustrated in their search for some version of Hobbes' sovereign,

have hesitated to ascribe the character "law" to international law.
Indeed, Austin's seminal analysis rests on the premise that law must

2
derive ultimately from one who issues commands and can compel compliance therewith--that is "the key to the science of jurisprudence
and morals" .

As Brierly points out, however, this demand for a

sovereign cannot, without distortion, account fo the development of
non-statutory modern municipal law, for example, the English Common
4
Law, and so should not prejudice our views of international law.

That settled principles of international relations are accepted as
binding upon all members of the international community must suffice in characterizing international law as, indeed, "legal," 5
regardless of the sovereign's absence.
Although it has been suggested that international law is
founded on moral obligation,6 legal obligation must involve something more, insofar as it binds its subjects.

What contravenes

notions of moral right, such as the classical tolerance of unjust
war, may be nevertheless legally permissible in international law;
yet the legal and moral systems may converge in other areas.
example of this are the laws respecting prisoners of war.

One

Where they

converge, however, there emerges a qualitative difference in their
various methods of enforcing their principles.

As noted

publicist Hans Kelsen explains,
a difference between law and morals cannot be found in what the
two social orders command or prohibit, but only in how they
command or prohibit a certain behavior. The fundamental
difference between law and morals is: law is a coercive order,
7
.. whereas morals is a social order without sanctions.

Ideally, a State will restrain itself through a Kantian
apprehension of natural duty, rather than through Machiavellian power
considerations of existing sanctions (e.g., war, reprisals).

Until

violence is effectively outlawed in the international sphere, however,
Kant alone cannot practically govern.

And should States, recognizing

their communal interests, assume a moral duty to restrain themselves,
external sanctions would still be necessary to remedy what Rawls
terms the "assurance problem" 8 as well as to sustain the "legal"
character of duty.

I will therefore begin with the premise that, for

international law to fulfill its function of maintaining order, a
system of sanctions, imposing legal (and not merely moral)
obligation is essential (though perhaps merely collateral regarding
other functions such as the encouragement of economic cooperation).

Enforcement by Decentralized Sanctions
International law resembles a municipal legal system, insofar
as its subjects are bound, by external sanctions, to its right-creating
and power-conferring principles.

It also resembles a moral system,

in that it posits norms while unable to enforce them effectively
through any central organ.

In form, international law thus falls

somewhere between municipal law and morality.

Emphasizing its

resemblance to the former, Kelsen develops the notion of decentralized
sanctions in international law.

As will be explained later, however,

the particular sanctions which he identified have grown increasingly
inappropriate, if not immoral, in the present context.
Kelsen defines international law as "a complex of norms
",9
regulating the mutual behavior of states,
thus giving prominence
to its prescriptive aspect.

It has been suggested elsewhere that
10
international law is merely what lawyers say it is.
Rather, it
is a body of morally-grounded principles which, though perhaps abused
by lawyers, diplomats, and politicians, nevertheless stands in
critical relation to the actual conduct of States.

These morally-

grounded principles include the basic principles of fundamental
equality among States irrespective of arbitrary contingencies of
historical fate, and the consequent principles of self-determination
without foreign intervention, of self-defense against attack, and of
pacta sunt servanda (assuming the treaties comply with the other norms
that govern States' relations).

Thus, although the actual conduct of

States may not comply with these principles, international law
remains essentially normative, not descriptive.
Mere recognition of these norms is insufficient, however, as they
must be, in some sense, binding upon their subjects.

Kelsen's notion that

"law is the primary norm which stipulates the sanction"'1 1 identifies the

sanction as the bridge between mere legal norms and rules of law.
Although the effectiveness of a legal system should be judged
according to its subjects' conduct rather than the degree of enforcement power behind its sanctions, international law has not--until
recently perhaps--reached a point where States might restrain themselves
for moral and humanitarian reasons rather than from coercion.

Thus,

while external sanctions may characterize international law at the
present juncture, regulating States' behavior through deliberative
power considerations, including their extreme coercive power:

war,

the moral aspect of States' self limitation should also be recognized.
To some extent, persuasion is increasingly effect by regard to moral
right, irrespective of convenience or profit.
The Hobbesian conception of law as orders backed up by threats
--appropriated in part by Kelsen--should thus be tempered with some
feeling of justice that it be, in some sense, right and fair to
enforce these orders.

This is so especially in the sui generis inter-

national sphere, where the political-economic consequences are
uniquely far-reaching and where, until recently, no central organ
existed to coordinate relations equitably.

Indeed, it is the moral

indifference of the specific physical sanctions that characterize
international law, particularly war and reprisals, which has undermined their utilitarian as well as moral value and mandated current
structural changes in the international legal system.
As mentioned earlier, a State will, in a well-ordered international community, be shaped and guided in its acts and judgments by

6
an internal sense of right and justice; just as the punishment of a
child will hopefully give way, in time, to his own mature self-moderation.

Unfortunately, contemporary politics has not yet fully crossed

the threshold to maturity.

To a great extent, it remains engulfed in a

battle of egoistic States pursuing their selfish desires--power rather
than justice serving as arbiter.

Former Secretary of State Henry

Kissinger adheres to the amoral view of international law as a tool to
be used and stretched by the powerful party where convenient, and
discarded if not amenable to such use.

Thus can he claim that "a power

can survive only if it is willing to fight for its interpretation of
justice and its conception of vital interests," and also suggests that
the use of military force might be an appropriate counter-measure
against an Arab oil embargo, albeit a flagrant violation of present
international law. 1 2

Thrasymachian justice, defined by the interests

of the stronger, continues to prevail.
Dismissing the notion of internal sanctions as meta-legal, if
not unreal, Kelsen requires as an essential character of international
law, if it is to be called "law,"

that it be "a coercive order, that is

to say, a set of norms regulating human behavior by attaching certain
coercive acts (sanctions) as consequences to certain facts, as delicts,
determined by this order as conditions." 1 3

While obviating Austin's

problem of the absent sovereign, Kelsen yet embraces the very doctrine
that transported Austin in search of the elusive fiction--the doctrine
that physical sanctions, while accidental to such other forms of social
control as religious or moral systems, are essential to a system if it

is to be termed "legal." 1 4

Hart also makes this distinction between

legal and moral rules, that is between rules that are enforced
through the threat and use of physical sanctions 1 5 and those that are
enforced through moral pressure, "respect for the rules, as things
important in themselves."

16

Kelsen identifies the specific sanctions of international law
as war and reprisals. 1 7

Under normal circumstances, however, war and

reprisals are delicts prohibited by international law.

18

Thus, the

same naked act of aggression--isolated from any legitimizing background
--may be either a delict or a sanction:

a moral jugement is compelled,

in order to determine if the belligerent act is or is not morally
justified.
Grotius' principle of bellum iustum has lain dormant during
much of the modern epoch, being only recently revived.

Before World

War I, each national State had the legal right to wage war for whatever reason it deemed right.

The peace treaties concluding World War

I, including the Covenant of the League of Nations, rejected this
amoral endorsement of war.

Conversely to such endorsement of war, the

wholesale rejection of war is also amoral, in that it shirks the
responsibility of morally evaluating specific acts of aggression that
may be justified.

These twentieth century agreements have revived

the Grotian distinction between just and unjust war--based on Natural
Law--and made it a part of the positive international law.

Thus, war

and reprisals represent for Kelsen the sanctions that maintain international stability, the particular States serving as executive arms of

international law.
This orderly scheme of international security and justice
unfortunately breaks down under scrutiny, as certain essential
characteristics of its municipal analogue are found to be lacking.
Three problems are particularly prominent.

First, the effectiveness

of war and reprisals as legal sanctions depends on the ability of the
wronged State, or of committed allies, 1 9 to wage these sanctions.

The

extent of such ability, as well as of the aggressor State's ability to
resist, are wholly arbitrary from a moral point of view.
Second, war and limited aggression have become too dangerous,
in the light of technological advances, to continue as viable sanctions.

In the wake of a laissez faire attitude, the international

community's interest in security must now override the individual
States' interests in advancing national policy or vindicating any
perceived wrongs, especially as the means contain the potential for
world devastation.

Ironically, the emergence of this problem mitigates

to some extent the first problem concerning arbitrary disparities in
size and military strength, insofar as the increasing proliferation of
nuclear weaponry tends to equalize immediately the holders' and their
allies' power.

As approximate equality is thus achieved--or at least

threatened--these disparities that once determined martial victory and
political sway become trivial, and a more effective system of
organized sanctions becomes possible.

20

Third, the State, against which military force is directed,
consists at bottom of individuals innocent, if not incognizant, of

international offense.

Yet, it is they who suffer the pains and

deprivations attendant on war, while the responsible individuals or
corporate bodies often endure unscathed.

Justice ultimately demands

that the law look behind the impersonal fiction of the State and
attach its sanctions directly to the responsible parties.

Further-

more, as corporations and international organizations as well as
individuals, join States as the subjects of international law, war as
a legal sanction becomes increasingly inappropriate.

The Emerging Character of International Law
Both moral and utilitarian considerations thus demand the
resolution of these discrepancies between theory and social reality
and strain the international legal structure as depicted by Kelsen.
The relatively recent evolution of new forms by moral and utilitarian
mandate brings international law closer to a just and efficient ordering of relations between international entities:

specifically,

through (1) the development of a centralized organ to administer the
law, (2) the resort to pacific settlement of disputes, and (3) the
characterization of individuals and corporations as subjects of international law.

These changes constitute respective responses to the

three challenges identified above as undermining the Kelsenian structure.
The phase of international law in which national States alone
determine its content and are its sole subjects, and in which war is
their primary instrument, is thus superceded, as States and war have
become obsolete for many purposes.

Once regarded as essential, these

10
institutions become merely accidental qualities of international law.
Whether its subjects are bound by means of external sanctions or an
emerging sense of duty to obey and submit to pacific settlement,
international law continues its normative function.

The norms of

international law necessarily adjust as political realities and
individuals' evolving sense of justice (made manifest in their institutions) change.

The law gradually broadens its prescriptive principles

to encompass these changes, not merely to describe them.
Kelsen's description of international law in terms of coercive
orders backed by sanctions, as analogous to the criminal law and police
institutions of municipal law, loses its vitality as it becomes
apparent that fairness and rationality in enforcement depend upon a
centralized and impartial organ.

Kelsen identifies the national States

as the organs of international law.

Yet to the extent that a powerful

or anarchistic State is granted the discretion to decide whether its
belligerent act is delictual or sanctioned, and no higher power can
recharacterize that act with binding force, 2 1 then the pre-World War I
blanket endorsement of war at the aggressor's option persists.

Kel-

sen's apparent removal from the political context and indifference to
the enforcement agency's self-serving motives, has been criticized:
Slight attempt is made to qualify the significance of these international rules in light of political realities, especially in
light of the retention in fact, despite the renunciation in law,
of military prerogative by nation-states, both in the sense of
the capability to wage war and of the discretion to bring the
22
capability to bear by processes of unilateral decision.
Not only is a particular State's ability to summon the pertinent
sanction fortuitous, if Kelsen's scheme is viewed realistically, but

11
the discretionary power to determine the right so to summon resides
in the summoner.
With regard ,to the emergence of a central organ performing
international management functions, the twentieth century has
witnessed two noble experiments:
Nations.

the League of Nations and the United

Though perhaps not rising to Falk's call for "the emergence

of effective supranational management" of the use and threat of
23
force,
they nonetheless represent significant advances toward
rationalizing a community of predominantly egoistic sovereigns.
As basic human wants are identified, -global communications
systems improve, and individuals develop a sense of justice, the
fragmented States that are the primary subjects of international law
should come to recognize their common concerns and so ultimately*
dissolve nationalistic separateness.

The emergence of effective

central organs would thus further these transnational interests as
well as equalize, if not sublimate, aggressive forces between States.
The League and the U.N. have both, however, been relatively ineffective in the particular function which these civilizing interests
presuppose, that is in curbing the threat or use of force by States.
While the Covenant of the League enabled its members to
coordinate their actions, the League itself never achieved the level
of an independent corporate body, transcendent of its members and
capable of its own action.

The Council of the League, and now the

U.N. General Assembly, might have initiated investigations and made
recommendations to its members; but the Security Council created by
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the U.N. Charter is of a different order, insofar as it is empowered
to bind all the members of the U.N. Article 25 of the Charter provides:
"The members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the
decisions of the Security Council, in accordance with the present
Charter."

Despite this seeming power to bind, coupled with express
24
enforcement provisions,
the Security Council's strength is
significantly diminished by the veto power held by the five major
25
powers.
Further, the ban of "force against the territorial integrity
or political independence of any state"2 6 ,fails to comprehend the
more insidious methods of seizing control that characterize the nuclear
age, such as meddling with internal regimes, training subversives, and
"just" intervention.

Both "classical" war and the U.N.'s "monopoly of

the lawful use of force''2 7 have become obsolete.
The relative ineffectiveness of the U.N. organs, their limited
ability to bind rather than merely advise the member States, underscores the continuing state of international politics.

Nevertheless,

the evolution of the League and the U.N., and the various States'
efforts at quasi-legislation through multilateral treaties and conventions have made clear that international life is not as

"poor, nasty,

brutish, and short" as it once was, but rather appears on the threshold of a constitutionally ordered community.

The emergence of these

central organs is not so much a cause as an indication of this shift
in attitude, from self-interested decision-making based on power considerations to dutiful submission to the just administration of
international law.

13
With regard to the pacific settlement of disputes, both third
party adjudication (arbitration or submission to the International
Court of Justice) and non-judicial means (negotiation, mediation,
conciliation) are now emerging as viable alternatives to war.

The

Pact of Paris of 1928 declares the illegality of advancing national
28
interests through war.
The U.N. obliges its members to settle
29

their international disputes peacefully,

through methods which

party States are coming to accept as both more efficient and just.

As

pointed out earlier, however, the U.N. is not sufficiently authoritarian.

Even under the Statute of the International Court of Justice,

allowing members to consent to compulsory submission under certain
30
circumstances,
or under treaties that provide for compulsory sub31
mission, the basis of the court's jurisdiction is wholly voluntary.

Thus, while indicative of a major advance over the resort to brute
force, such procedures can only be tenuous as long as egoistic
nationalism subsists.

As Brierly points out, as long as these modes

of pacific settlement lack sufficient binding force and States are
free to refuse subjection to the rule of law, each State stands
effectively as a law unto itself. 32

And while proliferation of

nuclear weapons might encourage self-restraint, its standing threat
is both unduly dangerous and weak.

Indeed, it is as weak as the sanc-

tion of credit loss held by commercial banks in their debt financing
of developing countries.

Its effectiveness lapses immediately upon

use.
Blockades or the seizure of ships in non-territorial waters,

14
as well as outright military reprisals, were approved by classical
33

international law, along with war, as matters of course.

Severely

limited by the Covenant of the League, however, these measures are
now prohibited by the U.N. Charter, regardless of the exhaustion of
all other remedies. 34

Two major exceptions to this general prohibi-

tion are the collective action by the U.N. Security Council to enforce
its directives, 35 and the member State's right to self-defense before
the U.N. is able to act. 36

These exceptions are far from secure,

however, insofar as the Security Council is susceptible to paralysis
by veto. 3 7

Further, the alternative regional agencies 38 may become

arms of particular States.

Thus the force that the Security Council or

the self-defender might ultimately bring to bear is itself an
intrinsic threat to peace.
Economic or political measuresthe severance of diplomatic
relations, the non-recognition of a de facto government, or economic
embargoes, while not as materially destructive as war, are nonetheless
arbitrary, divisive, and preclusive of mutual cooperation.

So, as

Quincy Wright proposes
the only solution appears to be the further development of third
party adjudication through the extension of jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice or the acceptance in last resort of
political arbitration as proposed by the General Act of the
Pacific Settlement of International Disputes 3 9 . .

.

endorsed by

the General Assembly of the U.N. in 1949.40
The breakdown of Kelsen's structure, based on the essential sanction,
is especially apparent here.

The pacific settlement of disputes

represents not an evolution to other forms of sanctions, but rather
a shift of emphasis from sanctions, whatever the form, to prevention.

I

With regard to individuals' acquisition of international

personality, the reaction to recent incidents of terrorism, as well as
the post-World War II trials of war criminals, indicate a tendency to
ascribe legal responsibility to individuals (and not just to States)
for acts that contravene international law.

Such ascription occurs,

regardless of the individuals' incidental pursuit of national interests
or compliance with municipal laws:
The very essence of the prosecution case is that the laws, the
Hitlerian decrees, the Draconic, corrupt, and perverted Nazi
judicial system themselves constituted the substance of war crimes
against humanity and that participation in the enactment and
41
enforcement of them amounts to complicity in crime.
Thus, rather than a particular State waging war against another State
in retribution for the acts of its nationals, an international organization--either permanent or ad hoc, directly or through a regional
agency--attaches its sanctions to the responsible party.
This same logic can certainly extend to corporations.

As

governments assume distributive functions once held solely by private
business, and as private business becomes increasingly involved in the
economic development of the Third World and the military defense of
the industrial world, the private corporation becomes, in effect, an
arm of the national state--in some instances, more powerful and
potentially dangerous than the States that it serves.

American state

law is totally ineffective in harnessing this power, as each state vies
for the tax support of domestic corporations by minimizing its
statutory regulation thereof.

While Federal regulation has filled

this void to some extent, it cannot effectively guide corporate

activity abroad.

Although international law has traditionally

refrained from pulling private corporations into its orbit, treating
them instead as nationals of particular'States, a public international
commercial law is beginning to develop.

42

This latter development, that is the endowment of non-State
entities with international personality, represents a significant moral
advance from the destruction of innocent individuals who may represent
the target State through its army or may merely live within its
This in itself is not to deny the justifiability of force for

borders.

a just cause, so long as the injustice opposed has exceeded a certain
point, the responsibile parties are targetted, and the force employed
is both reasonable under the circumstances and conducive to a just

43
Nevertheless, this change is still in its-infant stage, its

peace.

effects scarcely felt, as merely symbolic wars continue.

Conclusion
With regard to the type of sanctions imposed, international
law has, in the past, resembled municipal law.

With regard to its

mode of administration, however, international law has more closely
resembled customary law or a moral system, where sanctions may consist
'4 4
rather than
of "a general diffused hostile or critical reaction,"

45
punishment by an authorized central organ.

In this latter respect,

it is now progressing towards the municipal forms.

Moreover, the three

basic changes herein discussed reflect a moral progress, a reorientation from forceful aggression and the consequent attachment of sanctions, to self-restraint and the prevention of violence.

Although

17
these various changes are no longer inchoate, they have not sufficiently congealed as to delineate clearly the forms of a post-modern
international law.

Rather, with regard to all these changes, the

present phase is in transitu:

the state of international law rests

somewhere between a primitive and an advanced form, both on the
structural and the moral levels.
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